

(on McG B)

Feb 89

Can Men in Power be Trusted with Nuclear Weapons?

1. What risks are they willing to run?

For what?

When?

(to avoid what
threats to itself?)

2. What risks do they see?

(2 dangers: ²) like will, they will make "unrealistic" estimates
of risks, assuming non-response by opponents
non-use of thresholds

b) they will accept high risks

3. What restraints do they recognize — or fail to recognize?

How will purposes + constraints do they regard
nuclear weapons as available, divisible?
— nuclear threats, risks?

4. What are the priorities? (see JN Handbook, 274, par. 1)
277-78

5. What do they do — or not — to ensure control?

1 Feb 89

" 3 Safety Catches "

Leads

Advisors (Taylor)

Tight Control of Leads

see Dodge Plant

see McN on Polaris

McN + McG lived through 2 major
crises when world was scared

(and so was McN? or not?)

But they knew they and the boxes
were wholly bluffing — as was K —

(the boxes might have gone to war;
but war might have occurred; and
boxes weren't bluffing at each, only
want to — let alone advisors — not was
control prop. to

JFK to Son $\frac{1}{3} - \frac{1}{2}$ SU, wind

What were JFK's odds that
he would go all the way to war

What should they have been? (necessarily)
(are loss: son on JFK " " " ideally?)

Acheson & Berlin

Acheson draft

Acheson in Chen II - and

afterwards

- Hanks willing to take "multiple" risks

- " tending to understate risks

(of many responses)

(though others very exaggerated risks)

(Foylon, Dilla, Nitze, Acheson)

Wh I criticize the rights JFK Test,
wrongly (from "left", "doves")

I suspect JFK apologists are impatient;
give pressure (and still,

